

# Impact of Mortgage Brokers on Consumer Preferences and Perceptions

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# Consumer Confusion in Mortgages

- Households are increasingly responsible for financial decisions (e.g., mortgages, retirement savings, aged care)
- Yet many financial products are complex because:
  1. They have many attributes (e.g. interest rate, term, fixed/variable, interest-only, offset account)
  2. There are many alternatives (e.g. 4,000 available home loans on the market)
- Financial advisors might help, but their incentives may not be aligned with consumers

# Project Summary

- We study consumers' perceived confusion and importance level of common mortgage attributes on a best-worst scale
- We model the influence of broker-advisers on consumers' willingness to pay for mortgage attributes in a choice experiment
  - Compared with non-advised consumers, broker-advised consumers express preferences that value home loans with a longer-term and lower upfront fees.

# Data and Methods

- Focus Groups
- Online experiments in Australia (N=1,882)
  - Best-worst scaling on the importance and confusion of mortgage attributes
  - Discrete choice experiment
    - a) Mixed logit model with hierarchical parameters
    - b) Willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimated for each attribute and each respondent

# Summary Statistics

Table G.1 Descriptive statistics for respondent-specific characteristics (N=1,882)

	Frequency: n (%)
<i>Experience to consult broker</i>	
Yes	959 (50.96)
No	923 (49.04)
<i>Risk aversion</i>	
Yes	851 (45.22)
No	1,031 (54.78)
<i>Patient</i>	
Yes	1,293 (68.70)
No	589 (31.30)
<i>Financial literacy</i>	
Low	996 (52.92)
High (correct all 3 answers)	886 (47.08)
<i>Numeracy</i>	
Low	867 (46.07)
High (correct 2 answers or all 3 answers)	1,015 (53.93)
<i>Household income: range</i>	
Middle income households (\$45,000 - \$103,999)	963 (51.17)
High income households (\$104,000+)	919 (48.83)
<i>Mortgage experience</i>	
Currently have a mortgage	1,176 (62.49)
Never have a mortgage	706 (37.51)
<i>Decision maker in the household</i>	
I am	1,176 (62.49)
Someone else, or someone else and I are equally responsible	706 (37.51)
<i>Education level</i>	
≥ Bachelor's degree	1,045 (55.53)
< Bachelor's degree	837 (44.47)
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,882 (100)</b>
	<b>Mean</b>
<i>Age (years)</i>	45.15

Table H.1 Descriptive statistics for socio-demographics (N=1,882)

	Frequency: n (%)
<i>Gender</i>	
Female	964 (51.22)
Male	917 (48.72)
Prefer not to say	1 (0.05)
<i>Age: range</i>	
25-34 years	591 (31.40)
35-54 years	642 (34.11)
55-65 years	649 (34.48)
<i>Household income: range</i>	
Middle income households (\$45,000 - \$103,999)	963 (51.17)
High income households (\$104,000+)	919 (48.83)
<i>Educational level</i>	
Low	580 (30.82)
Middle	988 (52.50)
High	314 (16.68)
<i>Experience to consult broker</i>	
Yes	959 (50.96)
No	923 (49.04)
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,882 (100)</b>
<i>Mortgage experience</i>	
Currently have a mortgage	1,176
Had a mortgage in the past	459
Plan to take out a mortgage in the near future	675

# Clusters by Experience with Brokers

We group the consumers who have used brokers into two clusters via K-means based on their sociodemographic information:

- Cluster 1: older with more mortgage experience
- Cluster 2: younger with higher education and income, less mortgage experience

		Sample Mean							
Cluster	N	Used Broker	Age	Female	College	# of Mortgage s Before	Mortgage Literacy	Numeracy	High Income
brokered_1	388	1.00	55.65	0.47	0.47	2.83	0.85	0.58	0.46
brokered_2	570	1.00	33.13	0.51	0.72	1.93	0.76	0.48	0.60
non-brokered	923	0.00	48.16	0.53	0.49	2.26	0.77	0.56	0.43

# Mortgage Attributes in Best-Worst Scaling

	Attribute
1	Type of mortgage lender (major bank; other)
2	Loan term (years)
3	Interest rate
4	Type of interest rates: Fixed, Variable and Hybrid (split loan between fixed and variable interest rates)
5	Maximum Loan-to-Value Ratio (LVR)
6	Compulsory Lenders Mortgage Insurance (LMI)
7	Establishment fee
8	Repayment type: Principal and Interest (P&I) mortgage and Interest-Only (IO) mortgage
9	Ability to make extra repayments
10	Offset account
11	Redraw facility
12	Portability
13	Mortgage package

# Best-Worst Questions

## Set 1 of 13 - Confusion

Please tell us which mortgage feature is **MOST confusing** to you and which is **LEAST confusing** to you.

*Hover your cursor over the mortgage features to read the definition. Click [here](#) to review the description of all mortgage features (a new tab will open).*

Most confusing to me:	Mortgage features to evaluate	Least confusing to me:
<input type="radio"/>	Repayment types	<input type="radio"/>
<input type="radio"/>	Type of interest rates	<input type="radio"/>
<input type="radio"/>	Mortgage package (Home loan package)	<input type="radio"/>
<input type="radio"/>	Lenders Mortgage Insurance (LMI)	<input type="radio"/>



# Best-Worst Questions

## Set 1 of 13 - Importance


Please tell us which mortgage feature is **MOST important** to you and which is **LEAST important** to you.

*Hover your cursor over the mortgage features to read the definition. Click [here](#) to review the description of all mortgage features (a new tab will open).*

Most important to me:	Mortgage features to evaluate	Least important to me:
<input type="radio"/>	Offset account	<input type="radio"/>
<input type="radio"/>	Ability to make extra repayments	<input type="radio"/>
<input type="radio"/>	Types of mortgage lenders (providers)	<input type="radio"/>
<input type="radio"/>	Repayment types	<input type="radio"/>


# Maximum loan-to-value ratio is most confusing; Interest rate and flexible repayments look most important

Comparison of Average B-W scores (Confusion and Importance)




# Brokers seem to help reducing confusion with LVR

Comparison of Average B-W scores: Confusion (Broker vs No Broker)



# Brokers seem to reduce the variation in importance across attributes

Comparison of Average B-W scores: Importance (Broker vs No Broker)



# Part II: Discrete Choice Experiment

Choice set 1 of 4

If you are offered mortgage product options A, B and C below, which one would you most likely choose and least likely choose?

*Hover your cursor over the blue text for further information.*

Product A	Product B	Product C
1. Mortgage product A is provided by <b>Foreign banks</b>	1. Mortgage product B is provided by <b>Big four banks</b>	1. Mortgage product C is provided by <b>Credit unions and building societies</b>
2. Mortgage term is <b>20 years</b>	2. Mortgage term is <b>10 years</b>	2. Mortgage term is <b>30 years</b>
3. Interest rate is <b>5% p.a.</b>	3. Interest rate is <b>3.5% p.a.</b>	3. Interest rate is <b>4.5% p.a.</b>
4. <b>Hybrid</b> interest rate mortgage	4. <b>Fixed</b> interest rate mortgage	4. <b>Hybrid</b> interest rate mortgage
5. <b>No (\$0)</b> mortgage set up fee	5. <b>\$400</b> mortgage set up fee	5. <b>\$800</b> mortgage set up fee
6. <b>Principal and Interest (P&amp;I)</b> mortgage	6. <b>Principal and Interest (P&amp;I)</b> mortgage	6. <b>Interest-Only (IO)</b> mortgage
7. You <b>can</b> make <b>extra repayments</b>	7. You <b>cannot</b> make <b>extra repayments</b>	7. You <b>cannot</b> make <b>extra repayments</b>

These features are always the same for the three products

- **Maximum Loan-to-Value Ratio (LVR)** is 80%
- Lenders do NOT require you to pay **Lenders Mortgage Insurance (LMI)**
- **Offset account** is available
- **Redraw facility** is available
- **Portability** is available
- **Mortgage package** is not available

Most likely choose:	<div>Product A</div> <div><input type="radio"/></div>	<div>Product B</div> <div><input type="radio"/></div>	<div>Product C</div> <div><input type="radio"/></div>
Least likely choose:	<div>Product A</div> <div><input type="radio"/></div>	<div>Product B</div> <div><input type="radio"/></div>	<div>Product C</div> <div><input type="radio"/></div>

## From Mixed Logit to WTP Estimation

- In the traditional mixed logit model, the utility of respondent  $i$  choosing product  $j$  is:

$$\begin{aligned} U_{ij} = & \beta_{i1} \text{Interest Rate}_j + \beta_{i2} I_j(\text{Big Four Lender}) \\ & + \beta_{i3} \text{Term}_j + \beta_{i4} I_j(\text{Fixed Rate}) + \beta_{i5} I_j(\text{Variable Rate}) \\ & + \beta_{i6} \text{Establishment Fee}_j + \beta_{i7} I_j(\text{Principal and Interest}) \\ & + \beta_{i8} I_j(\text{Able to Pay Extra}) + \epsilon_{ij} \end{aligned}$$

where  $\beta$ s are random variables

## However, WTPs are hard to estimate in this model

For example,

$$\begin{aligned}w_{i2} &= \text{WTP of a big four lender for respondent } i \\&= -1 \times \frac{\text{Marginal utility of a big four lender}}{\text{Marginal utility of interest rate}} \\&= -\frac{\partial U_{ij}}{\partial \theta_{j2}} / \frac{\partial U_{ij}}{\partial \theta_{j1}} \\&= -\frac{\beta_{i2}}{\beta_{i1}}\end{aligned}$$

which is a ratio of two random variables and may not have a finite variance.

## Therefore, we estimate a mixed logit model in the WTP space (Train and Weeks 2005)

$$\begin{aligned} U_{ij} = & \beta_1 \left[ -1 \times \text{Interest Rate}_j + w_{i2} I_j(\text{Big Four Banks}) \right. \\ & + w_{i3} \text{Term}_j + w_{i4} I_j(\text{Fixed Rate}) + w_{i5} I_j(\text{Variable Rate}) \\ & + w_{i6} \text{Establishment Fee}_j + w_{i7} I_j(\text{Principal and Interest}) \\ & \left. + w_{i8} I_j(\text{Ability to make extra repayments}) + \varepsilon_{ij} \right] \\ \Leftrightarrow \frac{U_{ij}}{\beta_1} = & -1 \times \text{Interest Rate}_j + w_{i2} I_j(\text{Big Four Banks}) \\ & + w_{i3} \text{Term}_j + w_{i4} I_j(\text{Fixed Rate}) + w_{i5} I_j(\text{Variable Rate}) \\ & + w_{i6} \text{Establishment Fee}_j + w_{i7} I_j(\text{Principal and Interest}) \\ & + w_{i8} I_j(\text{Ability to make extra repayments}) + \varepsilon_{ij} \end{aligned}$$



The utility of respondent  $i$  choosing product  $j$  is:

$$\begin{aligned} U_{ij} = & \beta_1 [-Interest Rate_j + w_{i2} I_j(Big Four Lender) \\ & + w_{i3} Term_j + w_{i4} I_j(Fixed Rate) + w_{i5} I_j(Variable Rate) \\ & + w_{i6} Establishment Fee_j + w_{i7} I_j(Principal and Interest) \\ & + w_{i8} I_j(Able to Pay Extra) + \epsilon_{ij}] \end{aligned}$$

where  $\beta_1$  (WTP for the “price”) is a constant and  $w$ ’s are random variables

## Furthermore, we introduce a hierarchical structure to examine effects of chosen covariates on preferences

- For each respondent  $i$  and attribute  $k$  ( $k = 2, 3, \dots, 8$ ).

$$w_{ik} = w_k + \delta_{k1}I_i(\textit{Broker Cluster 1}) + \delta_{k2}I_i(\textit{Broker Cluster 2}) + \delta_{k3}I_i(\textit{Risk Averse}) \\ + \delta_{k4}I_i(\textit{Fin. Literate}) + \delta_{k5}I_i(\textit{Numerate}) + \delta_{k6}I_i(\textit{HH Decision Maker}) + \nu_{ik}$$

- We estimate the individualised WTP for each attribute and each respondent using this model.

# Consumers value flexible repayments and low establishment fees

Sample Average Individual WTP (measured in int. rate) and Estimated Impact								
	-1*Interest Rate	Big 4 Lender	Term	Fixed Rates	Variable Rates	Est. Fee (\$000)	P&I	Extra Payment
<b>Average WTP</b>	/	0.200	-0.011	0.115	0.331	-0.920	0.945	1.392
<b>Std. Err.</b>	/	0.008	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.009	0.015	0.023
<b>\$ impact on monthly payment</b>	/	\$52	\$49	\$79	\$166	-\$73	\$172	\$554
<b>\$ amount impact in 20 years in PV</b>	/	\$8,750	\$8,274	\$13,214	\$27,040	-\$12,856	\$28,062	\$80,243

Consumers are willing to pay, in terms of interest rate or dollar amount:

- 0.2% (\$8,750) to be served by a Big 4 lender
- 0.92% (\$12,856) to avoid \$1,000 establishment fee
- 1.4% (\$80,243) to be able to make extra payments

Note: for the \$ amount impact, we assume a 20-year \$500,000 mortgage with a fixed rate of 3.5% p.a.

# Heterogeneity in WTPs Explained by Different Factors

Hierarchical Parameters Model of the WTP for Each Attribute								
	-1*Interest Rate	Big 4 Lender	Term	Fixed Rates	Variable Rates	Est. Fee	P&I	Extra Payment
<b>Average WTP</b>	/	0.200	-0.011	0.115	0.331	-0.920	0.945	1.392
<b>Broker_Gp1</b>	/	-0.130	0.008	-0.060	0.160	-0.264**	-0.166	-0.057
<b>Broker_Gp2</b>	/	0.073	0.014**	-0.025	0.115	-0.264	-0.303**	-0.633***
<b>Risk Aversion</b>	/	0.119	0.005	0.009	0.227**	-0.481***	0.049	0.130
<b>Financial Literacy</b>	/	-0.135	0.003	-0.019	0.054	-0.264	0.394***	0.251**
<b>Numeracy</b>	/	0.132	0.004	-0.232**	-0.073	-0.218**	0.310**	0.185
<b>HH Decision Maker</b>	/	-0.187*	-0.014**	-0.130	-0.129	0.219**	-0.224**	-0.152
<b>Intercept</b>	0.806***	0.260**	-0.015**	0.346***	0.254**	-0.627***	0.834***	1.425***

Level of Significance: \*0.1 \*\*0.05 \*\*\*0.01

# Older broker-advised consumers (cluster 1) will pay more to avoid higher establishment fees

Hierarchical Parameters Model of the WTP for Each Attribute								
	-1*Interest Rate	Big 4 Lender	Term	Fixed Rates	Variable Rates	Est. Fee	P&I	Extra Payment
<b>Average WTP</b>	/	0.200	-0.011	0.115	0.331	-0.920	0.945	1.392
<b>Broker_Gp1</b>	/	-0.130	0.008	-0.060	0.160	-0.264**	-0.166	-0.057
<b>Broker_Gp2</b>	/	0.073	0.014**	-0.025	0.115	-0.264	-0.303**	-0.633***

## Younger broker-advised consumers (cluster 2) accept longer loan terms and place less value on P&I and flexible repayments

Hierarchical Parameters Model of the WTP for Each Attribute								
	-1*Interest Rate	Big 4 Lender	Term	Fixed Rates	Variable Rates	Est. Fee	P&I	Extra Payment
Average WTP	/	0.200	-0.011	0.115	0.331	-0.920	0.945	1.392
Broker_Gp1	/	-0.130	0.008	-0.060	0.160	-0.264**	-0.166	-0.057
Broker_Gp2	/	0.073	0.014**	-0.025	0.115	-0.264	-0.303**	-0.633***

# Summary

- We study the perceived confusion and importance of common mortgage attributes for Australia consumers via an online experiment (additional analysis on the role of brokers not shown)
- We estimate each consumer's WTP for mortgage attributes and examine the role of brokers on shaping consumer preferences.
- Compared with non-advised consumers, broker-advised consumers express preferences that align with broker incentives to tilt clients to longer-term home loans.