26th Colloquium on Pensions and Retirement Research, UNSW, 2 July 2018

Measured Investment Inefficiency of the Australian Superannuation System

Wilson Sy

Investment Analytics Research

Australian Superannuation System


Positive Impression Misleading

- Most do not understand performance
- Rapid asset growth of system
- Sampling bias of media reporting

	Large APRA	Corporate	Industry	Public sector	Retail		
Survivor Sample	111	13	38	11	43		
Percentage representation of the population							
2005	20	5	54	55	22		
2006	26	9	57	60	23		
2007	30	14	58	55	24		
2008	32	17	62	52	25		
2009	36	22	66	52	28		
2010	41	27	67	52	32		
2011	47	36	73	50	40		
2012	50	41	76	52	42		
2013	53	45	83	55	42		
2014	57	48	88	58	43		
2015	58	57	90	58	43		
2016	63	72	93	61	47		
2017	68	76	95	65	52		

2005: 1,078 distinct funds only 546 funds in "population"

276 new funds



Over-estimate by 2% p.a.

Robust Methods

Flow Quantity	Aggregates over 1997-2016 (\$ billion)			
Starting total assets	344			
Total contributions	1,697			
Net cash flow (after payouts)	869			
Net earnings	833			
Ending total assets	2,046			

Net earnings ~ Net payouts at 4% pa of total assets

Actual net return 4.1% pa; investment return 5.5% pa

Importance of Aggregate Performance


- Fund and option comparisons not persistent
- Some factor comparisons are persistent
- Sector comparisons are persistent due to factors
- Sector returns are asset-weighted returns of all members

Sector comparisons are important for individuals

Average returns for sectors (CAGR) 1997-2016


	Corporate	Industry	Public sector	Retail	Large APRA
Net investment return (after costs)	6.1 🤇	7.2	6.6	5.4	6.1
Operating expenses rate	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.9	0.6
Pre-tax return (after all costs)	5.7	6.7	6.3	4.6	5.6
Super tax rate	3.6*	0.4	0.6	1.0	0.9
Net return (after all costs and taxes)	2.1*	6.3	5.8	3.6	4.6

Investment return difference large Operating expenses smaller and constant




Performance difference *consistent* and *persistent*

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Risk-return correlation affected by cost



Industry 20/27 vs Retail 9/38 (Property & infrastructure/Cash & bonds)

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Sector Value Added and RAVA (% pa, 3 Years to Sept 2016)

	Corporate	Industry	Public sector	Retail	Large APRA
Net investment return	7.5	8.9	8.3	6.5	7.7
Benchmark return	8.2	8.9	8.4	7.8	8.3
Value added	-0.7	0	-0.1	-1.3	-0.6
RAVA (%)	-13	0	-2	-24	-11

$$RAVA(\%) = 100 \times \frac{Value \, added}{Benchmark \, volatility}$$

Public Offer Pre-tax Return Attribution (% pa, 3 Years to Sept 2016)

	Industry	Retail	Difference
Benchmark return	8.9	7.8	1.1
Investment cost	0	1.3	1.3
Operational cost	0.5	0.8	0.3
Pre-tax return	8.4	5.7	2.7

Over 45 years, typical worker nest-egg halved From \$2.1 million to \$1.1: loss of one million dollars

Governance: Stakeholders vs Service Providers

- Industry trustees mostly stakeholders
- *Retail* trustees mostly service providers

Retail members are regarded as consumers in competitive market of super products Engaged members trade and switch short-term

Information Asymmetry => Wealth transfer from beneficiaries to shareholders

\$12 to 16 billion pa loss

Conclusion

Retail trustees mismanage conflicts of interest

SIS Act: Section 52 (2):

(d) where there is a conflict between the duties of the trustee to the beneficiaries, or the interests of the beneficiaries, and the duties of the trustee to any other person or the interests of the trustee or an associate of the trustee:

(i) to give priority to the duties to and interests of the beneficiaries over the duties to and interests of other persons; and(ii) to ensure that the duties to the beneficiaries are met despite

the conflict; and

(iii) to ensure that the interests of the beneficiaries are not adversely affected by the conflict; and

(iv) to comply with the prudential standards in relation to conflicts;

For-profit trustees should be banned